The rapporteur (adjudicator) of Spain’s Constitutional Court has formally condemned the country’s unpopular prime minister cum despot, the far-left international socialist premier Pedro Sanchez.

The court’s rapporteur has simultaneously rejected Covid-related repression that Sanchez decreed for six months without ‘effective and real’ control to the governing Executive (Parliament-Congress). The finding considers it illegal to delegate state powers to the provinces to restrict freedoms.

The unconstitutionality of the State of Alarm also imposes a fine of 300 euros to a Leonese. Antonio Narváez, the adjudicating magistrate of what will be the second ruling of the Constitutional Court (TC) on the state of alarm decreed for six months by Pedro Sánchez, has already finalized his resolution.

The finding will again represent a legal renunciation for the Government due to Sanchez management of the pandemic. If in July the Constitutional Court already ruled that the first imposition of the state of alarm was unconstitutional because its restrictive measures of essential freedoms should have been protected by the state of exception, and not by the state of alarm. In this case, it was an abusive edict and in this case, the Court will go even further. The finding could result in a tsunami of compensation claims levelled against the Madrid-bases Marxist regime and its members.

Predictably, the Constitutional Court will now accept two of the three main arguments presented by Vox (right-wing anti-globalist party) in its appeal to denounce the discretion of some measures of the residence of the Spanish premier that, according to the first sentence, were subjective.

In the first place, it will be declared contrary to the law to have decreed an uninterrupted period of exceptionality in Spain for six months without a ‘real and effective’ parliamentary control of the Government.

The constitutional court thereby dismantles the edict of the parliament sponsored by Sánchez. And secondly, the so-called ‘co-governance’ will also suffer notable marks of unconstitutionality for having unduly attributed to the autonomous communities’ various restrictive measures of fundamental freedoms that they were not supposed to adopt.

The second state of alarm was approved on November 3, 2020, and unlike the previous one, Sánchez decreed it for six uninterrupted months. In contrast to the first state of alarm, imposed on March 14 of that same year, the President of the Government dispensed with the successive extensions that he had to ratify every fifteen days by a sufficient majority in the Congress of Deputies. He didn’t want to risk losing votes.

Thus, it continued uninterruptedly until May 9, 2021. In that period, Parliament remained practically shut down. Therefore, the legal provisions for the Government to submit, for example, to control sessions, were breached without sufficient legal justification.

There was only parliamentary activity as and when Pedro Sánchez decreed, in a political strategy that various opposition parties called a ‘kidnapping of Parliament.’

In this presentation, the adjudicator of the Constitutional Court will now rule that in order to comply with the requirement of supervision of the Government’s action during an exceptional period, such as such a long state of alarm, the rare and occasional appearances that Sánchez made in Congress were not enough, or those others that he delegated to the then Minister of Health, Salvador Illa, and later to Carolina Darias.

These appearances did not meet the minimum requirements for the real and effective control of the parliament as is required by legality in a rule of law. There was no proportionality between the seriousness of an alarm decreed for half a year in a row and the parliamentary accountability of the president of the Government and its ministers.

In addition, and in political, not legal, terms, (Prime Minister) Sánchez did not even keep his word to appear on the dates and on the terms to which he had initially committed to public opinion.

The legal analysis that the speaker will make on the scope of the ‘co-governance’ decreed by the Government is also new. Thus, the Constitutional Court foresees to consider unconstitutional the indiscriminate delegation to the communities of restrictive measures of freedoms – mass confinements, closures, or even curfews, because they lack the powers to do so in our legal system. At least, in the coercive terms in which some communities adopted them.

In fact, in recent months, there have already been numerous resolutions from different Superior Courts of Justice, and at least one also from the Supreme Court, highly critical of ‘co-governance’ and of the lack of legal anchor to limit freedoms by mere delegation or government authorization.

In short, the argument of the Constitutional Court advocate will be based on the fact that the indiscriminate delegation to regional governments of powers that affect fundamental rights implies an openly unconstitutional disempowerment of the State.